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REMEDIES FOR DETAINEES: THE IMPACT
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION ON
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES

ARZOO RAJANI*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (hereinafter ―ICE‖) is one of the
largest branches of the Department of Homeland Security and
its mission ―is to protect the security of the American people
and homeland by vigilantly enforcing the nation‘s
immigration and customs laws.‖1 The Office of Detention
and Removal Operations (hereinafter ―DRO‖) is one of the
four operational divisions of ICE whose mission is to
―identify and apprehend illegal aliens, fugitive aliens, and
criminal aliens, to manage them while in custody and to
enforce orders of removal from the United States.‖2 Prior to
the 1980s, it was highly unusual for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (hereinafter ―INS‖) to hold large scale
detention of legal or illegal aliens and the conventional policy
was to exclude undocumented aliens seeking residence at the
border or deporting those aliens who had crossed into the
* J.D. and MA in International Relations, St. Mary‘s University
School of Law, 2011; BA, University of Texas at Dallas, 2005. The
author would also like to thank her family and friends for their neverending love and support.
1
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2009). With
over 19,000 employees in over 400 offices, ICE plays an integral part in
the defense of this nation. Id. By using advance technology, ICE serves
various law enforcement agencies on federal, state, and local levels. Id.
2
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/dro (last visited Dec. 19, 2009). One of the
responsibilities of this department is to develop and maintain a system of
processing aliens through immigration courts and as well as enforcing
their removal. Id.
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United States illegally.3 Today, many immigrants end up in
detention centers because of random raids at worksites,
private residences, or stops for civil violations. INS contracts
out to various local jails for the care and control of these
detainees in their custody, making immigrant detainees one
of the ―fastest growing segment[s] of the jail population in
the United States.‖4
Even though these detainees have not committed any
crimes, INS detention centers treat them like criminals by
requiring them to wear prison uniforms, spend time in their
cells, transporting them in handcuffs, strip searching them,
denying them basic medical services and/or disciplining them
brutally for not following prison rules a result of detainees‘
poor English comprehension.5 Since detainees are granted
fewer due process rights than American prisoners, many
times these detainees are not even appointed legal counsel
unless they can afford it.6
Regardless of their legal status, immigrant detainees have
certain basic rights in the United States which flow from the
U.S. Constitution such as a right to counsel,7 a right to due
3

TERESA A. MILLER, The Impact of Mass Incarceration on
Immigration Policy, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 214, 214 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (mentioning other alternatives to detention of
aliens). Aliens, whether legal or illegal, had options such as bail, ―release
on one‘s own recognizance‖, and various other forms of relief other than
detention. Id. Even ―[a]liens who were legally residing in the United
States but who had committed acts subjecting them to deportation
likewise had options other than detention.‖ Id.
4
Id. In 1994, there were approximately fifty-five hundred detainees
held in the INS custody. Id. However, this number tripled to 16,000 in
1997 and rose to approximately 20,000 detainees by 2001. Id.
5
Id. Most detainees‘ only crime is that they came into United States
without proper documentation. Id. at 214. Many times, aliens seeking
asylum are detained as well as those immigrants who might have
overstayed their visa. Id.
6
Id. at 215. In fact, it has been reported that merely 11 percent of
immigrant detainees receive any legal representation. Id.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Sixth Amendment provides certain protections to
defendants in criminal trials. However, the Sixth
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process,8 a right to equal protection under the law,9 and
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.10 However,
Amendment does not apply to deportation proceedings,
which are considered civil actions. All Bivens actions
involving defects in a deportation proceeding should be
brought under the Fifth Amendment rather than the
Sixth Amendment. Most Sixth Amendment cases in the
detainee context pertain to the right of access to the
courts.
A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS
or Other Law Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property
Damage or Loss, III 6-7,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (citations omitted).
8
U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .‖).
The Supreme Court has also recognized a Bivens cause
of action arising from the Fifth Amendment‘s due
process clause. What is due process? Due process
generally requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Therefore, an administrative hearing or a court
proceeding may be required before federal officers take
some actions against detainees. Also, in some cases,
detainees must be provided with an opportunity to
complain … about an officer‘s action. Whether a due
process claim will be successful… can be answered by
asking … were the officer‘s actions negligent?
If yes: money damages may NOT be collected under
Bivens.
The reason… negligent conduct by a
government official, even though causing injury, does
NOT constitute a deprivation under the Due Process
Clause. A detainee may, however, be able to sue the
United States, in accordance with state tort law, under
the FTCA. If no: the plaintiff may be able to win and
recover monetary compensation under Bivens even if
the actions were random and unauthorized.
Administrative situations potentially violating the Due
Process Clause: (1) Complaints never resolved; (2)
Ineffective procedures for bringing complaints; (3)
Improper disciplinary procedures; and if (4) Pay for
labor is delayed.
A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS
or Other Law Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property
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many of these rights are violated regularly within the
immigration detention centers and in fact; immigration
experts have described the conditions within the detention
system as ―the worst of all worlds.‖11 In particular, medical
rights by ICE/DRO standard call for detainees to have access
to a broad range of medical services including diagnosis and
Damage or Loss, III 4-5, 33-34
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (citations omitted).
The Due Process Clause actions additionally includes claims that
revolve around issues of Equal Protection such as:
A plaintiff must allege that he or she was treated
differently than other detainees on the basis of some
impermissible factor, such as race, sex, or religion.
Equal Protection Clause/Due Process Clause claims
require that the plaintiff prove three elements:
1. He was treated differently than other prisoners based
on some characteristic.
2. The characteristic was not an acceptable basis for
discriminating between inmates, e.g., race, sex, or
religion.
3. Because of the differential treatment, he suffered
some injury.
Id.
9

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS
Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement
Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, III 7,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (―A detainee may make an Eighth Amendment
claim only if she was convicted of a crime and spent time in prison.‖).
11
Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/us/politics/04immig.html. The
immigration director of the National Council of La Raza stated ―[w]e
understand the need for sensible enforcement, but that does not mean
expanding programs that often led to civil rights violations.‖ Id. The
governor of Arizona, Ms. Napolitano stated that she would not call off
worksite or home raids but will continue looking for effective ways to do
it. Id.
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treatment.12 This standard is violated regularly and many
detainees have problems obtaining needed medical care.13
Most frequently, detainees‘ medical concerns include dental
problems, not receiving proper medication, or complaints of
severe pain are often minimized and dismissed.14
This comment examines the impact of the Ninth Circuit‘s
holding in medical neglect cases and whether the Second
Circuit made an error. To examine this issue, it must first be
understood what the factual and legal background is
concerning each case, the detainee‘s medical rights and the
types of actions they can bring against government
employees. After examining the law, the Second Circuit‘s
holding is then compared with the Ninth Circuit‘s holding.
Finally, this comment argues why the Supreme Court should
affirm the Ninth Circuit‘s holding.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND FOR CASTANEDA AND CUOCO
CASES
One such case medical neglect case is that of Francisco
Castaneda, an immigrant detainee who developed terminal
penile cancer and had his penis amputated because medical
personnel refused to provide him with a biopsy during his
nearly eleven-month detention by ICE.15 Castaneda entered
12

U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE/DRO Detention
Standard: Medical Care, 1-3 (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/PBNDS/pdf/medical_care.pdf.
13
Detention Watch Network, Conditions in Immigration Detention –
ICE Detention Standards,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2383 (last visited June 20,
2010).
14
Id.
15
Henry Weinstein, Feds‘ actions ‗beyond cruel‘, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/13/local/me-cruel13. The U.S.
District Judge allowed Castaneda‘s family to bring forth a claim and seek
financial damages from the government. Id. The Judge ―blasted public
health officials‘ ‗attempt to sidestep responsibility for what appears to be .
. . one of the most, if not the most, egregious‘ violations of the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment that ‗the
court has ever encountered.‘‖ Id.
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the San Diego Correctional Facility under ICE custody on
March 27, 2006 and immediately informed the medical
personnel that a lesion on his penis was growing painful,
bleeding and exuding discharge.16 Castaneda thereafter met
with the physician‘s assistant who recommended a urology
consultation and biopsy after an examination, noting of
Castaneda‘s medical history of genital warts and family
history of cancer.17
Castaneda was not provided an outside consultation until
June 7, 2006, more than two months after he entered ICE
custody.18 On that date Castaneda met with an oncologist
who determined that his symptoms required an urgent
diagnosis and treatment, including a biopsy.19 Castaneda‘s
treating physician at the detention center determined that the
biopsy was an elective outpatient procedure and rejected it
even though she admitted that a biopsy was medically
necessary and the only definitive way to rule out cancer.20
Over the next several months, Castaneda‘s symptoms
worsened but he did not receive the biopsy.21
The Division of Immigration Health Services‘
(hereinafter ―DIHS‖) records from November 14, reflect that
Castaneda‘s ―symptoms have worsened, . . . he feels a
constant pinching pain, . . . has blood and discharge on his
shorts, . . . [and] complains of a swollen rectum.‖22 DIHS
responded by prescribing Castaneda laxatives and increasing
his weekly allotment of boxer shorts.23 On January 25, 2007,

16

Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 684-85 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 685.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. (emphasizing that the condition could worsen if the benign
lesion is not promptly and properly treated). Although the notes indicated
that Castaneda should have been admitted for a biopsy, the DIHS
physicians determined that this would be costly and decided not to pursue
an outpatient biopsy. Id.
21
Id.
22
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 685 (9th Cir. 2008).
23
Id. at 686. Castaneda also complained that the lesion had grown
and it was hard for him to stand and urinate because it would spray
everywhere. Id. Additionally, Castaneda complained that the lesion was
17

216

Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law

Vol.5

Castaneda was seen by another doctor who also ordered a
biopsy after determining that Castaneda ―most likely [had]
penile cancer.‖24 However, on February 5, instead of
providing the biopsy, ICE released Castaneda, who then went
to the emergency room of Harbor-UCLA Hospital in Los
Angeles on February 8, where he was diagnosed with
squamous cell carcinoma of the penis.25His penis was
amputated on February 14, but the amputation did not occur
in time to save Castaneda‘s life, as the cancer had
metastasized and did not respond to numerous rounds of
chemotherapy.26 Castaneda died on February 16, 2008 at the
age of thirty-six.27
Castaneda‘s story is one of thousands involving detainees
who are denied basic medical rights every day. Additionally,
ICE detention centers are not the only ones with problems
providing adequate medical care to its detainees. Cuoco was
a ―pre-trial detainee at FCI Otisville‖ Prison and a
―preoperative male to female transsexual.‖28 Before she was
arrested, she was receiving treatments for her gender
transsexualism under a physician‘s supervision.29 Once
Cuoco entered the prison, she informed the physician‘s
assistant of her condition and at that time was allowed to
keep her medication for self-administration.30
continuously leaking blood and pus, which stained his sheets and his
underwear. Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. Most penile cancers are like Castaneda‘s, squamous cell
carcinomas, which is described as ―cancer that begins in flat cells lining
the penis.‖ See U.S. Nat‘l Inst. of Health, Penile Cancer,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/penile (last visited Dec. 20,
2009).
26
Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 686.
27
Id. at 686-87. The cancer not only created ―a 4.5 centimeter-deep
tumor in his penis‖, but it also spread to his lymph nodes and eventually
throughout his body. Id. at 686. Even though Castaneda received
chemotherapy for a year, it was not enough to save his life. Id.
28
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2000).
29
Id.
30
Id. Cuoco at that time also told the physician‘s assistant that the
dosage of her medicine will be lowered when her operation will take
place. Id. Based on that information, she was allowed to keep ten tablets
of hormones. Id.
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On September 10, Cuoco met with a physician who called
her ―the HE/SHE‖ and told her that he knew nothing about
transsexuals and never diagnosed or treated them in his
medical career.31 Although the physician agreed to renew
Cuoco‘s prescription, he did only at a quarter the level that is
required for her treatment.32 The Bureau of Prisons Health
Services Manual states:
It is the policy of the Bureau of Prisons to
maintain the transsexual inmate at the level of
change existing upon admission to the Bureau.
Should responsible medical staff determine
that either progressive or regressive treatment
changes are indicated, these changes must be
approved by the [Bureau of Prisons] Medical
Director prior to implementation. The use of
hormones to maintain secondary sexual
characteristics may be continued at
approximately the same levels as prior to
incarceration, but such use must be approved
by the Medical Director.33
On September 17, Cuoco met with the same physician
who told her that she would not be getting any more
medication.34 Since she had not undergone the surgery she
was not considered a true transsexual and the Bureau of
Prisons policy only applied to true transsexuals.35 In
response, Cuoco threatened suicide and ―began to suffer
psychological and physical withdrawal symptoms resulting
from the termination of the estrogen treatment.‖36
31

Id. at 103-04. The physician also asked Cuoco if she was planning
to have surgery while in prison and after Cuoco told him that she didn‘t
have any such plans, the physician decided to renew her medication. Id.
32
Id. at 104.
33
Id. (citing Fed. Bureau of Prison Health Serv. Manual, § 6803
(2008)).
34
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2000).
35
Id. at 104.
36
Id. Cuoco made several other suicide threats but instead of getting
medical assistance, she was placed in isolation. Id. Furthermore, she was
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Both the cases discussed above were tried in appellate
courts and even though both have similar circumstances of
health officials denying the detainees their basic medical care
and violating their constitutional rights, they had opposite
holdings. In determining the question whether medical
personnel can claim absolute immunity under the terms of the
Public Health Service Act (hereinafter ―PHSA‖), the Second
Circuit in Cuoco held in the affirmative,37 while the Ninth
Circuit in Castaneda held in the negative.38 In determining
whether the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter ―FTCA‖) is
the exclusive remedy for actions against members of the
Public Health Service (hereinafter, ―PHS‖), the Second
Circuit held in the affirmative,39 while the Ninth Circuit held
in the negative.40
III. LAW ON DETAINEES‘ RIGHTS
A. Medical Rights Afforded to Detainees
The history of immigration detention centers goes as far
back as the 1890s when up until that point immigrants were
not detained while awaiting resolution of their legal status.41
harshly treated by stripping her down to her underwear and being forced
to sleep in the cold. Id.
37
Id. at 107. ―We conclude that under its plain meaning, §233(a)
covers the conduct of both Barraco and Moritsugu.‖ Id.
38
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2008)
(The court concluded that §233 does not provide absolute immunity to
public health service employees from constitutional claims.).
39
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (7th Cir. 1980)) (―[W]hen defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and
viewed as equally effective‘ the plaintiff is barred from bringing a Bivens
action.‖). The court found that FTCA is that alternative remedy. Id.
40
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 699 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding ―§233(a) does not explicitly declare the FTCA to be a substitute
remedy for Bivens actions against the PHS officers and employees‖).
41
Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention
in the U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (―The detention system is vast, ever-changing, and
shrouded in secrecy.‖).
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This changed in the 1890s with the opening of Ellis Island
and the first immigration detention center.42 Ellis Island was
closed in 1952 after Congress passed the Immigration and
Nationality Act (hereinafter ―INA‖) which mandated that
immigrants be detained only in cases where they posed a
serious risk to security.43 In the 1990s, there was a major shift

Detention places extreme financial and emotional
burdens on families by separating children, parents,
siblings, and spouses from one another. One in five
American families is of ―mixed‖ status with U.S.
citizens, legal permanent residents and undocumented
family members in one household. When someone is
detained it leaves a considerable impact on families and
local communities – children become parentless,
families lose their breadwinners, and jobs and
community
responsibilities
become
vacant.
International law requires that the United States protect
the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of
society.
Id.
42

Id. (Detention is seen as the only way to ensure that immigrants
appear for their court proceedings.). International law prohibits arbitrary
detention.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 9, requires that anyone who is deprived of
liberty by arrest or detention should be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention
and order release if the detention is not lawful. This
right is guaranteed regardless of national origin.
International law also requires that anyone deprived of
liberty must be treated with humanity and respect for
the inherent dignity of the person.
Id.
43

Id. (According to the government, those immigrants who have
criminal records pose serious security risks.).
However, many times ―[t]he harshness of the detention
and deportation system may force immigrants in the
U.S. to go into hiding and live in fear. Undocumented
persons often do not seek help in emergencies or report
crimes for fear of exposing themselves to immigration

220

Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law

Vol.5

in immigration policy because detention centers were used as
a primary means of enforcement regardless of whether the
detainee posed any security threat.44 In 1994, the average
daily population of a detention center was approximately
5,000 detainees, but after September 11, 2001, the average
daily population went up to 19,000 detainees and currently
approximately 32,000 people are detained every day. 45
Even though the average daily population of detainees has
tripled throughout the years, the amount of funds that the
government spends on immigrant detainees‘ care, especially
health care, has not even doubled.46 As a result, many
detainees either suffer from injuries or die because of
diseases.47 The ICE/DRO‘s Operations Manual regarding
detainee‘s health care states:
authorities, making communities more unsafe. Those
escaping persecution in their home countries may also
be deterred from applying for asylum, putting them at
grave risk.‖
Id.
44

Id. (Detention is known to be used as means to deter people from
immigrating to the United States.).
45
Id. (―The detention and deportation of immigrants is a multibillion dollar industry.‖). ICE‘s goal is to deport as many aliens as
possible by the year 2012. Id.
46
Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention
in the U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (addressing the small amount of funds spent on
immigration detention center). Many times detention is contracted out to
private corporations who profit from detention by cutting corners. Id.
47
Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention
in the U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (addressing the lack of resources for immigrant
detainees and the poor conditions along with abuses that have been
reported in detention centers throughout the country); Problems with
Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International
Law of the Comm. On the Judiciary House of Rep., 110th Cong. 1-2
(2008) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, S. Comm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International
Law), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:42722.pdf (There
have been many reports by news agencies such as THE WASHINGTON
POST or 60 MINUTES regarding medical care that is provided to detainees
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Detainees will have access to a continuum of
health care services, including prevention,
health education, diagnosis, and treatment.
Health care needs will be met in a timely and
efficient manner. Newly admitted detainees
will be informed, orally and in writing, about
how to access health services. . . A
transportation system will be available that
ensures timely access to health care services
that are only available outside the facility,
including: prioritization of medical need,
urgency (such as the use of ambulance instead
of standard transportation) and transfer of
medical information. A detainee who requires
close, chronic or convalescent medical
supervision will be treated in accordance with
a written plan approved by licensed physician,
dentist, or mental health practitioner that
includes directions to health care providers
and other involved medical personnel.
Detainees will have access to specified 24hour emergency medical, dental, and mental
health services . . . . Detainees with chronic
conditions will receive care and treatment for
conditions where non-treatment would result
in negative outcomes or permanent disability
as determined by the clinical medical
authority.48
at ICE immigration centers.). Many of these reports include actual
documents and interviews with government employees who have revealed
all the information that the government tries to hide. Id. For example, at
the San Pedro facility ―the clinical director prohibited medical staff from
doing any lab work for detainees no matter what their condition until they
had been detained for more than 30 days.‖ Id.
48
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE/DRO Detention
Standard: Medical Care, 1-3, (Dec. 2, 2008),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/PBNDS/pdf/medical_care.pdf; Detention
Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention in the U.S.,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last visited Oct. 21,
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Even with the above guidelines, sick immigrant detainees
are ―locked in a world of slow care, poor care and no care,
with panic and cover-ups among employees watching it
happen, according to a [Washington] Post investigation.‖49
As a result, many immigrant detainees and their families have
brought civil actions against the United States government
and its employees.
B. Actions against Government Employees in Medical
Neglect Cases
The FTCA, passed by Congress in 1948, gave American
citizens the right to sue the federal government.50 The FTCA
allows a civil action to be brought against the United States
government for money damages as a result of the loss of
personal property, personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission by a government
employee acting within the scope of their employment.51 The
FTCA also allows civil claims to be brought against the
federal government ―under circumstances where the United
States, if acting as a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.‖52
2009) (ICE standards are not strictly enforced in a majority of the
detention centers, resulting in various human rights abuses.).
49
Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, Careless Detention: System of
Neglect, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/immigration/cwc_d1p1.html (Many of the detainees
who are physically sick or even mentally ill are denied basic medical
treatment which they are entitled to by law.).
50
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A § 1346(b) (2006).
51
Id.
52
Id. (The FTCA allows claims to be brought forward for wrongful
conduct of negligence, assault, battery, false imprisonment, abuse of
process, and malicious prosecution.); See American Bar Association, A
Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other
Law Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or
Loss, II 1-2,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
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In 1971, Congress passed the PHSA, which provides
absolute immunity from suit for PHS employees. 53 The
PHSA states that the remedy against the United States
provided in the Act precludes a remedy for damage of
personal injury or death from the performance of medical or
related functions by a commissioned officer or employee of
the Public Health Service while acting within the scope of his
office or employment. 54 Even though there were no remedies
available for constitutional violations committed by federal
agents, the Supreme Court had long held that federal courts
had the power to grant relief not expressly authorized by
statute as well as the power to adjust remedies to grant relief
made necessary by the particular circumstances of the case at
hand.55 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a violation of a specific
constitutional amendment by a federal employee was
recognized as a cause of action for monetary damages and the
victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the
Amendment itself, despite the lack of any federal statute
authorizing such a suit.56 The existence of a remedy for the
violation was implied from the importance of the right
violated and without Bivens actions, the right to hold federal
employees personally liable for malicious, vicious and even
depraved actions is severely limited under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and subsequent revisions.57
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (Additionally, FTCA is usually interpreted as all
claims are mainly resolved in the favor of the government of the U.S.).
53
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §233(a) (2006).
54
Id.
55
Adele P. Kimmel, Conal Doyle & Thomas M. Dempsey,
Litigating Medical Neglect Cases on Behalf of Immigrant Detainees: The
Impact of the Ninth Circuit‘s Decision in Castaneda v. Henneford,
http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/Litigating%20Medical%20
Neglect%20Cases%20on%20Behalf%20of%20Immigrant%20Detainees.
pdf.
56
Id. at 2.
57
Id. (asserting that Bivens created a civil rights cause of action
against constitutional violations); A.B.A., A Legal Guide for INS
Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement
Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, I,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
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In 1976, Estelle v. Gamble established three basic rights
of prisoners to bring medical neglect claims under the Eighth
Amendment‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause: (1) the
right to access to care, (2) the right to care that is ordered, and
(3) the right to a professional medical judgment.58 ―The right
to access to care—emergency and routine, as well as
specialists and hospitals when needed—is fundamental.
When access is denied or delayed, the health staff does not
know which patients need immediate attention and which
need care that can wait. ‗A well-monitored and well-run
access system is the best way to protect prisoners from
unnecessary harm and suffering and, concomitantly, to
protect prison officials from liability for denying access to
needed medical care.‘‖59
In 1980, Carlson v. Green established a federal prisoner‘s
right to bring a Bivens claim for medical neglect under the
Eighth Amendment in addition to a suit under the FTCA.60
Carlson also created an exception to this rule: a Bivens
remedy will not be available when an alternative remedy is
both declared as a substitute and is equally effective or in the
presence of special factors which militate against a direct
recovery remedy. But in the case of Carlson, the Court held
that there was nothing stated in the FTCA or its legislative
history to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens

visited Dec. 20, 2009) (―INS detainees who have been injured due to the
actions of federal officers before or during their stay in a federal, state, or
local detention center may file BOTH a FTCA complaint against the
United States and a Bivens complaint against individual officers at the
same time in order to obtain monetary compensation for their injuries.‖).
58
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (emphasizing that
deliberate indifference to a person‘s medical needs is an Eight
Amendment violation).
59
William J. Rold, 30 Years After Estelle v. Gamble: A Legal
Retrospective, National Commission on Correctional Health Care,
http://www.ncchc.org/pubs/CC/legal_30years.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2009) (citing E. Winner, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of
Prison Medical Care, 1 J. OF PRISON HEALTH 67 (1981).
60
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-23 (1980) (asserting the various
remedies available for medical rights violation).

2010

Remedies for Detainees

225

remedy or create an equally effective remedy for
constitutional violations.61
In 1988, Congress passed the Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act (hereinafter, ―LRTCA‖),
which states:
(b)(1) The remedy against the United States
provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this
title for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death arising or resulting from the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment
is exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding for money damages by reason of
the same subject matter against the employee
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or
against the estate of such employee. Any other
civil action or proceeding for money damages
arising out of or relating to the same subject
matter against the employee or the employee's
estate is precluded without regard to when the
act or omission occurred.
(b)(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply
to a civil action against an employee of the
Government—
(A) which is brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States, or
(B) which is brought for a violation of a
statute of the United States under which such
action against an individual is otherwise
authorized. 62
The LRTCA amended the FTCA to provide for the
substitution of the United States as a defendant in any action
61

Id. (arguing how there is an exception but the burden would fall on
the defendant to meet the requirements).
62
Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988).
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where one of its employees is sued for damages as a result of
an alleged common law tort committed within the scope of
his or her employment.63 Congress enacted the LRTCA to
respond to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Westfall v. Erwin, which limited a federal official's absolute
immunity from tort claims to situations where the official's
actions were ―within the outer perimeter of an official's duties
and . . . discretionary in nature.‖64 Congress saw the Westfall
decision as an erosion of the common law tort immunity
formerly available to federal employees and even though it
acts as a general grant of immunity to government employees
for all official acts, it clarifies that the general immunity does
not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of
the government.65
In Cuoco, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the District Court‘s dismissal of the action.66 The
Second Circuit found that the prison medical director and
chief medical officer were absolutely immune under the
PHSA.67 Further, the Court held that a ―government official
is entitled to qualified immunity from suit for actions taken as
a government official if: (1) the conduct attributed to the
official is not prohibited by federal law, constitutional or
otherwise, (2) the plaintiff's right not to be subjected to such
conduct by the official was not clearly established at the time
of the conduct, or (3) the official's action was objectively
legally reasonable in light of the legal rules that were clearly
established at the time it was taken.‖68 The Second Circuit,

63

Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679 (1988).
64
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 300 (1988).
65
Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1988).
66
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2000).
67
Id. at 109.
68
Id. at 107, 109, 112 (stating new exceptions to the claim against
individual employees); See American Bar Association, A Legal Guide for
INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement
Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, II-6,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (The FTCA provides different definitions of
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however, incorrectly applied the Carlson exception to a
Bivens remedy and rejected the Bivens claim against the PHS
officials.69
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Castaneda held that PHS
officials can be sued for violating an immigrant detainee‘s
constitutional right to adequate medical care.70
After
applying the two part test of Carlson, the Court held that the
PHSA was not an alternative remedy to Bivens and was not
equally effective to preempt Bivens.71 The Court also rejected
the argument that FTCA is the exclusive remedy for
unconstitutional conduct by government doctors and other
PHS officials and keeping with its analysis, the Court
permitted a Bivens claim against PHS employees.72
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
―[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖73
A. The Second Circuit Erred in Rejecting the Bivens Claim
In Cuoco, the Appellate Court denied Cuoco‘s ―cruel and
unusual punishment‖ claim because at the time the claim was
filed, Cuoco was a pre-trial detainee and was not being
punished.74 The Court however, did affirm the District
federal and local employees versus government contractors and which one
can be brought a claim against.).
69
Cuoco, 222 F.3d 99 at 108.
70
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682 (9th Cir. 2008).
71
Id. at 688.
72
Id.
73
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (asserting that the constitution
specifically uses the word person). The constitution does not address the
rights of citizens versus the rights of aliens. Id.
74
Id. at 104 (justifying the reasons for the court‘s decisions); Weyant
v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) (―In the context of a convicted
prisoner, who has a right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from
cruel and unusual punishments, ‗[a] prison official‘s ‗deliberate
indifference‘ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the
Eighth Amendment.‘‖).
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Court‘s decision of accepting the claim under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.75 The Court applied
the Fourteenth Amendment test developed in Weyant76 to the
Bivens action under the Fifth Amendment.77 The Court
concluded that Cuoco‘s action lied in the fact that because the
medical staff denied her, ―an unconvicted detainee,
‗treatment that [she] needed to remedy a serious medical
condition and [they] did so because of their deliberate
indifference to that need.‘‖78 Deliberate indifference is
defined as ―something more than mere negligence‖ and proof
of intent is not a requirement because the standard is
―satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.‖79 Although medical malpractice is not ordinarily
75

Id. at 106 (explaining how the court applied the Bivens remedy to
this claim); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542 n.21 (1987) (quoting Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975)) (stating that the equal
protection analysis is the same as under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
76
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) (referring to the
medical portion of the test). ―Now, as far as the medical care is
concerned, the plaintiff must show that the deprivation was sufficiently
serious and it was unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.‖ Id. at 851.
77
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996) (Since the defendants
were federal rather than state officers, a Bivens remedy under Fifth
Amendment is more appropriate.).
78
Id.; Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987)
(―Courts have repeatedly held that treatment of a psychiatric or
psychological condition may present a ‗serious medical need‘ . . . . There
is no reason to treat transsexualism differently than any other psychiatric
disorder. Thus . . . plaintiff‘s complaint does state a ‗serious medical
need.‘‖); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving the
description of transsexualism as a psychiatric disorder)).
79
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (defining what
constitutes deliberate indifference); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698,
702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)) (―An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when
the official ―knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
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deliberate indifference, it can be if it involves recklessness,
for example an officer‘s conscious act or failure to act which
leads to a substantial risk of harm.80
However, the Second Circuit granted the defendant‘s
motion for summary judgment based on their analysis of the
PHSA.81 The Court looked at the plain meaning of the Act
and concluded that ―[t]he complained behavior of these
defendants thus occurred within the scope of their offices or
employment and during the course of their ‗performance of
medical . . . or related functions‘‖ and as such are absolutely
immune from any claims against them.82 In addition, the
Court stated that Cuoco‘s exclusive remedy for injuries
caused by the defendant‘s behavior is against the United
States under the FTCA.83 To reach this conclusion, the Court
relied on dicta in Carlson stating that ‗―when defendants
show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which
it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective‘ the
plaintiff is then barred from bringing a Bivens action.‖84 The
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.‘‖).
80
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 n.14 (1976)).
81
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 105-12 (2d Cir. 2000)
(addressing the court‘s decision in granting summary judgment). The
court has often applied the Eighth Amendments‘ indifference test to pretrial detainees bringing action under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 106.
82
Id. at 107 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 233(a)) (analyzing the court‘s
reasons for granting immunity because they are acting within their
capacity as government officers); id. (quoting Cheung v. United States,
213 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000)) (―In construing the terms of a statute, we
look first to its language to ascertain its plain meaning.‖).
83
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing
the court‘s decision to discount Bivens remedy); Id. (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)) (―‗[T]he denial of a substantial claim
of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the
essence of absolute immunity is its possessor‘s entitlement not to have to
answer for his conduct in civil damages action.‘‖).
84
Id. at 108 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980));
Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000) (―In construing
the terms of a statute, we look first to its language to ascertain its plain
meaning.‖).
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Court read this to imply that the PHSA created FTCA as an
expressly declared substitute for Bivens.85 In Carlson, the
Supreme Court wrote that its conclusion that the FTCA
complements Bivens, rather than replaces it, is supported by
the ―significant fact that Congress follows the practice of
explicitly stating what it means to make the FTCA an
exclusive remedy.‖86
Even though Cuoco argued that the FTCA is an
inadequate remedy because it only provides for declaratory
relief and not injunctive relief, the Court disregarded that
argument.87 Further, since Cuoco was no longer a pre-trial
detainee, no longer incarcerated at the prison, her estrogen
problem was resolved, and she made no claims that the
defendants would deny her necessary treatments in the future,
the Court decided that Cuoco‘s argument was moot.88 In fact,
the Court stated that if Cuoco could prove that either of the
defendants violated her constitutional rights in the course of
something other than the performance of medical or related
functions, or while acting outside of the scope of their
employment, they would not be provided with absolute
immunity.89 To defend this argument, the Court applied
several principles of immunity, one of which is that: ―[a]
government official is entitled to qualified immunity from
suit for actions taken as a government official if (1) the
conduct attributed to the official is not prohibited by the
federal law, constitutional or otherwise; (2) the plaintiff‘s
right not be subjected to such conduct by the official was not
clearly established at the time of the conduct; or (3) the
official‘s action was objectively legally reasonable in light of

85

Id.
Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
87
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2000).
88
Id. Cuoco also alleged that Barraco and Moritsugu were
inexperienced doctors and that‘s why they prescribed the wrong course of
treatment. Id. at 107.
89
Id. at 109. ―Public Health Service officers or employees are
protected from suits that sound in medical malpractice.‖ Id. at 108
(quoting Mendez v. Belton, 739 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1984)).
86
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the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was
taken.‖90
In addition, when Cuoco tried to raise the defense that the
defendants should have interjected when she was denied her
medication, the Court held that ―the absence of a factual
predicate for the allegations against defendants . . . leads to
the conclusion that these defendants are named in the action
solely because of their supervisory positions. In a Bivens
action, such a respondeat superior theory will not suffice.‖91
Cuoco also tried to raise awareness to the fact that the health
officials were indifferent when they made inappropriate
statements such as calling her a ―HE/SHE‖, but the Court
held that rudeness and name calling is not a violation of
constitutional rights.92 Cuoco tried to appeal the decision by
claiming that these defendants were not just named for their
supervisory capacity but that they actually were in a position
to intervene when Cuoco was denied her medicine and
instead treated her with deliberate indifference.93 Even
though Cuoco‘s ―failure to intervene‖ claim should have
survived the defendant‘s motion to dismiss, the Court
nonetheless affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendants
because they were entitled to qualified immunity.94
Furthermore, the District Court in Cuoco‘s case stated
that even though Cuoco had tried to raise a claim against the
federal prison‘s policy maker, she was unsuccessful even
though a policy maker in its supervisory capacity has the
authority to declare which rules should be followed and if
that person ―created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy
or custom to continue, [or] . . . if he or she was grossly
negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful
condition or event,‖ then that person would be held liable, but

90

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
92
Id. at 109; Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating what is not considered constitutional violation).
93
Id. at 110.
94
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
91
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in this case there was not sufficient evidence to hold that
policy maker liable.95
The Court in Cuoco also failed to discuss whether
Congress viewed the remedies provided under the FTCA as
"equally effective" as those provided under Bivens, a question
that the Carlson Court explicitly answered in the negative.96
Under Carlson, compliance with its "equally effective" prong
is a necessary pre-condition for holding a statutory remedy to
be a substitute for a Bivens cause of action and thus, Cuoco's
failure to address that prong or the answer provided by
Carlson is contrary to governing Supreme Court precedent.
B. The Ninth Circuit was Correct in its Rulings Regarding a
Bivens Claim.
The scope of the PHSA‘s immunity presents an important
federal question. Although the Second Circuit in Cuoco
concluded that this Act makes the FTCA the exclusive
remedy for damage claims arising out of medical related care
provided by federal PHS officers,97 they erred in their
holding. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis and
application of the Carlson test in Castaneda led to the
conclusion that the PHSA does not make FTCA the exclusive
remedy and it certainly does not preclude an action under
Bivens.98
In Castaneda, a constitutional rights violation and
medical malpractice action was brought against the United
States government under the FTCA and against several
federal officials and medical personnel under Bivens.99 After
Castaneda‘s death, his sister and daughter, substituting
95

Id. at 109 (quoting Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
96
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (stressing how court
disregarded the comparison of Bivens and FTCA).
97
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2000).
98
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 2008)
(asserting that Carlson was correct in its conclusion).
99
Id. at 687; BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (8th ed. 2004) (The
term malpractice means negligence or incompetence in performing one‘s
professional duties.).
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themselves as plaintiffs, brought additional claims under the
California Wrongful Death Statute seeking compensatory and
punitive damages.100
When addressing the question of whether the PHSA
really did make the FTCA an exclusive remedy and
precluded a Bivens claim, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
precedent.101 In Carlson, the Supreme Court stated the
situations in which a Bivens claim can be defeated.102 First, if
a defendant shows ―special factors counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress.‖103 Second, if
the defendant demonstrates that ―Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which is explicitly declared to be a
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and
viewed as equally effective‖ as a Bivens claim.104
The facts of the Carlson case closely resemble the facts of
Castaneda. In Carlson, a deceased federal prisoner‘s mother
brought suit on behalf of her son against the prison officials
whose deliberate indifference to her son‘s serious medical
condition caused his death, thus, violating his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.105 The defendants in that case argued that the
FTCA provided a substitute remedy to Bivens and the Court
rejected that argument by stating that no statute declared the
FTCA to be a substitute for Bivens and the legislative history
confirms that Congress views the FTCA and Bivens as
complimentary causes of action.106 Similarly, in Castaneda,
Castaneda died due to deliberate indifference on the part of
the PHS officials in regards to his medical condition and once
again, a cause of action alleging Fifth and Eighth Amendment

100

Id. at 687.
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
102
Id.
103
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
104
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
105
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
106
Id. at 19-20; id. at 16 n.1 (This case involved an equal protection
claim stating that petitioner‘s ―indifference was in part attributable to
racial prejudice.‖).
101
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violations was brought and the defendants argued that the
FTCA substitutes any Bivens remedy.107
To reach its decision, the Court in Castaneda first looked
at whether the PHSA really establishes the ―FTCA as a
substitute remedy for Bivens.‖108 As mentioned above, the
Court in Carlson established a two part test that can preempt
a Bivens remedy: first, Congress must provide an alternative
remedy which is to be a substitute for a Bivens remedy;
second, Congress must view that alternate remedy as equally
effective as the Bivens remedy.109
When analyzing the first part of the Carlson test, the
Castaneda Court looked to the text of the PHSA, which by its
plain language does not declare the FTCA to be a substitute
for Bivens actions against PHS personnel.110 Moreover, the
statute‘s title, ―Defense of Certain Malpractice and
Negligence Suits‖ indicates that Congress wanted to extend
immunity to common law malpractice and negligence actions
and not to actions alleging constitutional violations, thereby
leading the U.S. Supreme Court to reject the defendant‘s
argument that the language in the statute extended toward
actions claiming constitutional violations.111 In addition, the
PHSA was enacted by Congress six months before Bivens
was decided and furthermore, it predates Estelle v. Gamble
by six years, where a remedy under the Eighth Amendment
for deliberate indifference to prisoner‘s serious medical needs
was established.112 Therefore, the Court concluded that
Congress did not have the desire to substitute Bivens with the
FTCA when the thing being substituted did not exist at the
time.113
Moreover, the Court analyzed the legislative history of
the PHSA and concluded that Congress only intended for the
107

Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2008);
id. at 688 n.6 (The only difference is that unlike the Plaintiff in Carlson
who was a criminal convict, Castaneda was an immigrant detainee.).
108
Id. at 689.
109
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
110
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2008).
111
Id. at 693-4.
112
Id. at 693.
113
Id. at 692.

2010

Remedies for Detainees

235

immunity to extend to common law malpractice and
negligence actions and not Bivens actions.114 This conclusion
that Congress views the FTCA as parallel and not a substitute
to a Bivens remedy is signified by the fact that Congress
would have explicitly stated if it meant to make FTCA claims
a substitute for Bivens actions. ―An ordinary reader, at the
time of [the PHSA‘s] passage, would have understood ‗any
other civil action or proceeding‘ with respect to ‗personal
injury, including death, resulting from the performance of
medical, surgical, dental or related functions‘ to refer instead
to a host of common law and statutory malpractice
actions.‖115 In fact, the Supreme Court in Estelle
differentiated between a malpractice suit and an Eighth
Amendment violation suit.116 The Court in Estelle found that
―[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to
state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.‖117 Although a claim
arising from a constitutional violation might be appropriate
for malpractice, the two are still very different from each
other.
In fact, when Congress passed the LRTCA in 1988, it
extended the FTCA‘s immunity to government employees for
all acts whether within the scope of their official duties or not
and it specifically clarified that the general immunity ―does
not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of
the Government which is brought for a violation of the
Constitution of the United States.‖118 Through this Act,
Congress confirmed the Court‘s holding in Carlson, that

114

Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 693 (citing oral argument).
116
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
117
Id.
118
Fed. Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (1988).
115
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constitutional claims are outside the scope of the FTCA and it
certainly does not preempt a Bivens remedy.119
The second part of Carlson‘s two-part test provides that
Congress must view the alternate remedy as ―equally
effective‖ as a Bivens remedy and although the defendants in
Castaneda argued that the FTCA is that alternate remedy, the
Court looked at the preceding Supreme Court case of
Carlson, in which the Court held the opposite: Congress did
not view FTCA as an alternate remedy and certainly not as
effective as Bivens remedy.120 In fact, Carlson stated four
reasons for the FTCA not being as effective as the Bivens
remedy.121 First, damages under Bivens are awarded against
individual federal employees while damages under FTCA are
awarded against the United States government and in this
manner Bivens is more effective because the threat of
financial liability has a deterrent effect on individual
employees.122 Second, punitive damages are not awarded
under FTCA, while Bivens allows for punitive damages
thereby further deterring employees from violating
individual‘s constitutional rights.123
Third, unlike the FTCA, a Bivens remedy permits a
plaintiff to request a jury trial.124 Fourth, liability under the
FTCA is limited by ―the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred‖ and in fact, the Carlson Court stated that
this last factor is an important one because under the FTCA, a
plaintiff‘s action can fail depending on the law of the forum
119

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (examining legislative
history to determine whether Congress viewed it as a substitute or
complementary remedy).
120
Id. at 18-20.
121
Id. at 21.
122
Id. at n.7 (―Indeed, underlying the qualified immunity which
public officials enjoy for actions taken in good faith is the fear that
exposure to personal liability would otherwise deter them from acting at
all.‖).
123
Id. at 21-22; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978)
(However, there have been times where courts have not awarded punitive
damages because it found that the defendants ―did not act with a
malicious intention to deprive respondents of their rights or to do them
other injury.‖).
124
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22.
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state thus motivating a Bivens remedy.125 The Court
emphasized that ―only a uniform federal rule of survivorship
will suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation here
alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.‖126
Keeping the above in mind, the Court in Castaneda
emphasized that if Castaneda‘s remedy was available only
under the FTCA, then Castaneda would have to face many
hurdles depending on state law to bring a suit in the first
place and based on Carlson‘s holding, specifically that the
FTCA is not ―equally effective‖ as Bivens, the Castaneda
Court held that the PHSA does not preempt Bivens remedy.127
125

Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23 (1980) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b) (1997)); id. at 17-18 n.4 (Depending on the state law, certain
personal injury claims would not survive and especially if a decedent was
not survived by a spouse or a dependent next of kin.); A.B.A., A Legal
Guide for INS Detainees: Actions Brought Against INS or Other Law
Enforcement Officials for Personal Injury or Property Damage or Loss, II
3, http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (Additionally, monetary damages which are
controlled by state law are limited to money damages and that ―include
reasonable compensation for personal injury or loss of property.‖).
The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may be
entitled to monetary compensation for ―loss of
enjoyment of life.‖ These damages must be based
solely on a government employee‘s simple negligence,
NOT on the government employee‘s intentional or
egregious conduct. However, state law determines how
much money may be recovered and whether the loss of
enjoyment of life claim fits within the state‘s definition
of compensatory damages.
Id. (citing Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 303-4 (1992)).
126
Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23 (1980).
127
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 691 (9th Cir. 2008);
American Bar Association, A Legal Guide for INS Detainees: Actions
Brought Against INS or Other Law Enforcement Officials for Personal
Injury or Property Damage or Loss, II 4,
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ftcaandbivens.pdf (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009).
Additionally, FTCA has many exceptions and if any exception applies to
the situation the case will be automatically dismissed for lacking
jurisdiction. Following are exceptions and exclusions in FTCA:
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Since the defendant failed to meet Carlson‘s two part test,
the Court in Castaneda then looked for any ―special factors‖
precluding a Bivens remedy by stating that ―where Congress
fails to explicitly declare a remedy to be a substitute for
recovery directly under the Constitution or to provide a
remedy that is as effective a remedy for constitutional tort, a
Bivens action may still be precluded.‖128 The Court in
Carlson noted that a Bivens action can be defeated if the
Foreign Country Exception: If a detainee‘s injuries
occurred outside the United States, no FTCA claim may
be made.
Intentional Torts Exception: Only investigative or law
enforcement officers may be sued for intentional torts
like ―assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and abuse of process. FTCA suits for
intentional torts against individuals who are NOT law
enforcement INS employees are prohibited.
Other Torts Excluded from the FTCA: Libel
(publication of something that injuries the reputation of
another person); slander (saying something that injures
the reputation of another person); misrepresentation
(telling you something untrue); deceit; or interference
with contracts.
Detention of Goods Exclusion: Any claim arising from
the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other
property by any customs or tax officer or any law
enforcement officer is excluded.
Discretionary Function Exception: Precludes suits
―based upon an act or omission of any employee of the
Government, exercising due care in the execution of a
statute or regulation, or based upon the performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary duty.‖
Detention decisions that are not directly mandated by
statute are discretionary and fit within the exception.
For example, a detention facility‘s policy decision to
require sick or injured detainees to go to hospitals rather
than to receive in-house treatment is discretionary.
Id. at II 4-5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006)).
128
Castaneda v. Henneford, 546 F.3d 682, 700 (9th Cir. 2008).
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defendant shows any ‗―special factors‘ counseling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.‖129
Although the Castaneda Court recognized that after
Carlson, the Supreme Court has found other remedial
schemes to be ―special factors‖ precluding Bivens relief, the
Court noted that none of those decisions has ―overruled
Carlson‘s square holding that there are no special factors that
preclude a Bivens action in a case whose facts and posture
mirror this one.‖130 Therefore, Carlson‘s holding that the
FTCA is not a ―special factor‖ precluding Bivens relief
remains good law and compelled the Court in Castaneda to
reject the defendant‘s arguments.131 In any event, Congress
has taken ―affirmative action‖ with respect to the point
argued by the defendants in Castaneda by expressly
preserving a Bivens action against all federal employees
under the LRTCA and thus, there is no ―absence of
affirmative action from Congress‖ that would warrant
examining the ―special factors‖ test.132
For all the reasons stated above, Castaneda‘s holding is
consistent with that of Carlson‘s. Carlson places the burden
on defendants to show an explicit declaration from Congress
that the PHSA precludes Bivens claims.133 The Court in
Castaneda followed that directive and conducted an
extensive analysis of the language, the historical context, and
legislative history of both the PHSA and the LRTCA,
concluding that Congress did not intend the PHSA to bar the
Bivens action against PHS medical personnel.134
V. CONCLUSION

129

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (quoting Bivens, 403
U.S. at 396).
130
Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997)) (―The
presence of a deliberately crafted statutory remedial system is one ‗special
factor‘ that precludes a Bivens remedy.‖).
131
Id. at 701.
132
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
133
Id. at 18-9.
134
Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 700-02 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Although Francisco Castaneda‘s story is tragic, it is not
unique.135 Every day, there are thousands of immigrants
placed in privately run ICE detention facilities around the
country who are unable to access appropriate medical and
mental health support or services.136 In fact, the ―most
common complaints from detainees in the United States is
‗severe and widespread problems‘ with access to medical
care.‖137 The fact that necessary medical treatments have
been denied to detainees is supported by documents
specifically stating ―the amount of money ICE saved by
denying requests for treatment‖ such as ―requests which were
all submitted by on-site medical personnel . . . for such
things as tuberculosis, pneumonia, bone fractures, head
trauma, chest pain, and other serious complaints‖ and it is
135

Francisco Castaneda, Presentation on Medical Care and Deaths
in ICE Custody,
http:/www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file841_32062.pdf (2007).
I had to be here today because I am not the only one
who didn‘t get the medical care I needed. It was a
routine for detainees to have to wait weeks or months to
get even basic care. Who knows how many tragic
endings can be avoided if ICE will only remember that,
regardless of why a person is in detention and
regardless of where they will end up, they are still
human and deserve basic, humane medical care.
Id.
136

Paul Wayner, Prisoners without Convicts: Why Similar
Protections As Those Offered to Prison Inmates By the Constitution
Should be Extended to Immigrant Detainees, available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=paul
_wayner (Apr. 13, 2009).
137
Id. (arguing the reasons for extending constitutional rights to
immigrant detainees). There are many problems that occur in regards to
medical attention that detainees need such as no sick forms to inform the
medical personnel, late response to sometimes no response at all to
medical requests, etc. Id. These types of problems lead to ―delay in
detection or treatment of medical conditions.‖ Id. Many times, mental
health patients are not given medical attention or even if they are given
medication, it has been changed to a generic form or different dosage of
medicine or a different type of medicine altogether. Id. This leads to
many problems and ―adversely affect the mental stability of the detainee
and the institution and can inhibit effective legal representation.‖ Id.
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absurd ―[h]ow an off-site bureaucrat can deny a request to
treat tuberculosis or a bone fracture….‖138
Although the United States Constitution does not give an
immigrant a constitutional right to enter the country, it does
provide immigrants with certain basic rights when they are
within the borders of this country.139 Among these rights are
the right to counsel,140 a right to due process,141 a right to
equal protection under the law,142 and protection from cruel
and unusual punishment.143 When these rights have been
violated, there are remedies that are afforded to these
immigrants.144
The federal government has created national guidelines
that ―intend to set a standard of consistent care and fair
treatment for detainees in immigrant custody.‖145 In fact,
138

Problems with Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security, and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of
Rep., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman,
S. Comm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and
International Law), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:42722.pdf;
Detention Watch Network, The History of Immigration Detention in the
U.S., http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2381 (last visited Oct.
21, 2009) (―Detention and deportation are extreme and punitive measures
for individuals going through a civil administrative process. The very act
of detention attaches a stigma of criminalization to immigrants and
enmeshes them in the U.S. criminal justice system.‖).
139
A.C.L.U., The Rights of Immigrants, American Civil Liberties
Union, The Rights of Immigrants, available at
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rights-immigrants-aclu-positionpaper (2000) (Laws punishing immigrants without just cause violate their
right to fair and equal treatment.).
140
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
141
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see A.C.L.U., The Rights of
Immigrants, available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rightsimmigrants-aclu-position-paper (2000) (Constitutional rights apply to
every person within the U.S. border including Aliens.).
143
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
144
A.C.L.U., The Rights of Immigrants, available at
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/rights-immigrants-aclu-positionpaper (2000).
145
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Performance
Based National Detention Standards, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm
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there are forty-two detailed standards that outline specific
directions relating to things such as dietary needs, medical
access, telephone use, etc.146 However, since ICE guidelines
are not codified, the law does not enforce them, and the lack
of binding guidelines curtails the agency‘s accountability in
protecting immigrant detainees‘ rights. Nevertheless,
throughout the years there have been remedies made
available to immigrants who bring forth claims of violation of
their rights.
Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the
Castaneda case, it should consider the two compelling
arguments of the Ninth Circuit and affirm and recognize
Congress‘s desire to preserve a Bivens claim against PHS
employees. In particular, the Supreme Court should consider
the fact that contrary to the Second Circuits holding in
Cuoco, the Ninth Circuit in Castaneda affirmed that the
PHSA does not provide immunity to PHS employees based
on an analysis of the plain language of the Act.147 The Ninth
Circuit applied the Carlson test to the PHSA and considered
whether Congress had provided an alternative remedy to
Bivens that it declared to be a substitute for rather than
complimentary to Bivens; and if it had, whether Congress had
viewed that remedy as equally effective to a Bivens
(2008) (―ICE‘s mission is to protect the security of the American people
and homeland by vigilantly enforcing the nation‘s immigration and
customs laws.‖); Problems with Immigration Detainee Medical Care:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees,
Border Security, and International Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary
House of Rep., 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren,
Chairwoman, S. Comm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Security, and International Law), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:42722.pdf.
(Documents tell us that employees complained of certain policies that
appear to be in violation of ICE‘s detention standards . . . [d]ocuments
show that ICE‘s policy may be designed to deny care and save money
rather than to provide care and save lives.‖).
146
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Performance
Based National Detention Standards, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm
(2008).
147
Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 692 (9th Cir. 2008).
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remedy.148 The Ninth Circuit, after its detailed analysis, held
in the negative to both questions considered above.149 It also
considered the historical context of the statute and the
legislative history to support its conclusion.150
The Supreme Court has two compelling reasons for
affirming the Ninth Circuit‘s holding and recognizing
Congress‘s intent to preserve the Bivens remedy against PHS
employees. It should consider and appreciate the Ninth
Circuit‘s analysis and the PHSA‘s legislative history and
historical context. In addition, the Ninth Circuit‘s analysis of
the Carlson test is far more compelling than the contrary
analysis of the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit did not
even perform a proper analysis because it did not recognize
the difference between a medical negligence claim and a
constitutional violation claim. Furthermore, the Second
Circuit did not address how the LRTCA exempts Bivens
claims from the FTCA‘s exclusion provision.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has strong reasons for
affirming the Ninth Circuit‘s holding. This will not only
encourage immigrant detainees to bring forth claims of their
constitutional violations but will in fact hold accountable the
PHS employees who are deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of these immigrant detainees. In fact,
since there is a split in the Circuit Courts on this issue, the
Supreme Court decision will promote national uniformity
because just as other federal employees are subject to Bivens
actions so too are the PHS employees.

148

Id. at 688.
Id. at 692-99; id. at 700 (quoting Moore v. Glickman, 113 F.3d
988, 991 (9th Cir. 1997)) (―The presence of a deliberately crafted
statutory remedial system is one ‗special factor‘ that precludes a Bivens
remedy.‖).
150
Id.
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